* @copyright 2005 Janrain, Inc. * @license http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/lesser.html LGPL */ /** * A regular expression that matches a domain ending in a top-level domains. * Used in checking trust roots for sanity. * * @access private */ define('Auth_OpenID___TLDs', '/\.(com|edu|gov|int|mil|net|org|biz|info|name|museum|coop|aero|ac|' . 'ad|ae|af|ag|ai|al|am|an|ao|aq|ar|as|at|au|aw|az|ba|bb|bd|be|bf|bg|' . 'bh|bi|bj|bm|bn|bo|br|bs|bt|bv|bw|by|bz|ca|cc|cd|cf|cg|ch|ci|ck|cl|' . 'cm|cn|co|cr|cu|cv|cx|cy|cz|de|dj|dk|dm|do|dz|ec|ee|eg|eh|er|es|et|' . 'fi|fj|fk|fm|fo|fr|ga|gd|ge|gf|gg|gh|gi|gl|gm|gn|gp|gq|gr|gs|gt|gu|' . 'gw|gy|hk|hm|hn|hr|ht|hu|id|ie|il|im|in|io|iq|ir|is|it|je|jm|jo|jp|' . 'ke|kg|kh|ki|km|kn|kp|kr|kw|ky|kz|la|lb|lc|li|lk|lr|ls|lt|lu|lv|ly|' . 'ma|mc|md|mg|mh|mk|ml|mm|mn|mo|mp|mq|mr|ms|mt|mu|mv|mw|mx|my|mz|na|' . 'nc|ne|nf|ng|ni|nl|no|np|nr|nu|nz|om|pa|pe|pf|pg|ph|pk|pl|pm|pn|pr|' . 'ps|pt|pw|py|qa|re|ro|ru|rw|sa|sb|sc|sd|se|sg|sh|si|sj|sk|sl|sm|sn|' . 'so|sr|st|sv|sy|sz|tc|td|tf|tg|th|tj|tk|tm|tn|to|tp|tr|tt|tv|tw|tz|' . 'ua|ug|uk|um|us|uy|uz|va|vc|ve|vg|vi|vn|vu|wf|ws|ye|yt|yu|za|zm|zw)$/'); /** * A wrapper for trust-root related functions */ class Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot { /** * Parse a URL into its trust_root parts. * * @static * * @access private * * @param string $trust_root The url to parse * * @return mixed $parsed Either an associative array of trust root * parts or false if parsing failed. */ function _parse($trust_root) { $parts = @parse_url($trust_root); if ($parts === false) { return false; } $required_parts = array('scheme', 'host'); $forbidden_parts = array('user', 'pass', 'fragment'); $keys = array_keys($parts); if (array_intersect($keys, $required_parts) != $required_parts) { return false; } if (array_intersect($keys, $forbidden_parts) != array()) { return false; } // Return false if the original trust root value has more than // one port specification. if (preg_match("/:\/\/[^:]+(:\d+){2,}(\/|$)/", $trust_root)) { return false; } $scheme = strtolower($parts['scheme']); $allowed_schemes = array('http', 'https'); if (!in_array($scheme, $allowed_schemes)) { return false; } $parts['scheme'] = $scheme; $host = strtolower($parts['host']); $hostparts = explode('*', $host); switch (count($hostparts)) { case 1: $parts['wildcard'] = false; break; case 2: if ($hostparts[0] || ($hostparts[1] && substr($hostparts[1], 0, 1) != '.')) { return false; } $host = $hostparts[1]; $parts['wildcard'] = true; break; default: return false; } if (strpos($host, ':') !== false) { return false; } $parts['host'] = $host; if (isset($parts['path'])) { $path = strtolower($parts['path']); if (substr($path, -1) != '/') { $path .= '/'; } } else { $path = '/'; } $parts['path'] = $path; if (!isset($parts['port'])) { $parts['port'] = false; } return $parts; } /** * Is this trust root sane? * * A trust root is sane if it is syntactically valid and it has a * reasonable domain name. Specifically, the domain name must be * more than one level below a standard TLD or more than two * levels below a two-letter tld. * * For example, '*.com' is not a sane trust root, but '*.foo.com' * is. '*.co.uk' is not sane, but '*.bbc.co.uk' is. * * This check is not always correct, but it attempts to err on the * side of marking sane trust roots insane instead of marking * insane trust roots sane. For example, 'kink.fm' is marked as * insane even though it "should" (for some meaning of should) be * marked sane. * * This function should be used when creating OpenID servers to * alert the users of the server when a consumer attempts to get * the user to accept a suspicious trust root. * * @static * @param string $trust_root The trust root to check * @return bool $sanity Whether the trust root looks OK */ function isSane($trust_root) { $parts = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($trust_root); if ($parts === false) { return false; } // Localhost is a special case if ($parts['host'] == 'localhost') { return true; } // Get the top-level domain of the host. If it is not a valid TLD, // it's not sane. preg_match(Auth_OpenID___TLDs, $parts['host'], $matches); if (!$matches) { return false; } $tld = $matches[1]; // Require at least two levels of specificity for non-country // tlds and three levels for country tlds. $elements = explode('.', $parts['host']); $n = count($elements); if ($parts['wildcard']) { $n -= 1; } if (strlen($tld) == 2) { $n -= 1; } if ($n <= 1) { return false; } return true; } /** * Does this URL match the given trust root? * * Return whether the URL falls under the given trust root. This * does not check whether the trust root is sane. If the URL or * trust root do not parse, this function will return false. * * @param string $trust_root The trust root to match against * * @param string $url The URL to check * * @return bool $matches Whether the URL matches against the * trust root */ function match($trust_root, $url) { $trust_root_parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($trust_root); $url_parsed = Auth_OpenID_TrustRoot::_parse($url); if (!$trust_root_parsed || !$url_parsed) { return false; } // Check hosts matching if ($url_parsed['wildcard']) { return false; } if ($trust_root_parsed['wildcard']) { $host_tail = $trust_root_parsed['host']; $host = $url_parsed['host']; if ($host_tail && substr($host, -(strlen($host_tail))) != $host_tail && substr($host_tail, 1) != $host) { return false; } } else { if ($trust_root_parsed['host'] != $url_parsed['host']) { return false; } } // Check path and query matching $base_path = $trust_root_parsed['path']; $path = $url_parsed['path']; if (!isset($trust_root_parsed['query'])) { if (substr($path, 0, strlen($base_path)) != $base_path) { return false; } } else { $base_query = $trust_root_parsed['query']; $query = @$url_parsed['query']; $qplus = substr($query, 0, strlen($base_query) + 1); $bqplus = $base_query . '&'; if ($base_path != $path || ($base_query != $query && $qplus != $bqplus)) { return false; } } // The port and scheme need to match exactly return ($trust_root_parsed['scheme'] == $url_parsed['scheme'] && $url_parsed['port'] === $trust_root_parsed['port']); } } ?>